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Abstract
Credit Default Swaps have become a large part of financial markets and recently the
center of debate between academics and regulators alike. Transferring the techniques to measure
information flow between the CDS market and stock markets presented by Acharya and Johnson
(2007), this paper looks at the relationship between a countries sovereign CDS spread level and
its predominate stock exchange. Under the back drop of the Greek Credit Crisis in Spring of
2010 I measure contagion effects in the Euro Zone comparing the level of Granger causality
significance between the stock and CDS market. I find that the greatest information flow from
the CDS market to the stock market is during credit shocks or times of high credit distress. My
results also point to the significance of the contagion effect in the CDS market but not in the
stock market.

ii

Table of Contents
1. Introduction

1

2. Literature Review

4

a. On Lead-Lag Relationship Stock, Bond, and CDS markets

4

b. On Contagion Effects

7

3. Data

7

4. Methodology

9

a. 4.1 Cross-Correlation

10

b. 4.2 CDS Innovation

11

c. 4.3 Information Flow, CDS to Stock Market

12

d. 4.4 Contagion Level Comparison

16

5. Conclusion

20

6. Figures and Tables

22

7. References

29

iii

1

1. Introduction
The credit derivative market has been vastly and rapidly evolving over the past decade.
Credit Default Swaps, otherwise known as CDS, are the most common credit derivative traded
and are powerful tools for investors looking to hedge out the credit risk in their portfolio. These
Credit Default Swaps can be purchased on the debt of nations as well as companies. The
underlying asset may be different, however the functionality of a CDS security is similar. An
investor holding some level of a country’s or company’s debt can purchase a CDS in order to
protect themselves from the chance that the underlining asset defaults. The purchase price is
based off a spread above the asset and is usually paid once a year. In the chance of default the
seller of the CDS must pay the entire principal of the bond, or an agreed upon compensation, to
the buyer. In essence a Credit Default Swap acts as insurance on a debt instrument.
Since the financial crisis of 2008, the CDS market has been a focus point of debate
between regulators and financial institutions. Often the CDS market is pointed to as the culprit
that vastly exacerbated the financial crisis in 2008 as well as the most recent Greek Credit Crisis
in April of 2010. Contrary to this belief there are some that say the CDS market has been
unjustly vilified, rather we should look to the CDS market as the preliminary alert system
pertaining to the financial health of a nation. This paper sets out to validate this statement.
To explore this argument I begin by analyzing the lead leg relationship between the
sovereign CDS market and the respective stock exchanges. Using a similar model as Acharya
and Johnson (2007) who looked at insider trading in the institutional CDS market, I initial create
a CDS innovation variable to better isolate distinct spread movements in the CDS market. From
there I analyze whether or not the lagged returns of this variable effect the current stock returns.
The intuition being, that the information pertaining to the fiscal health of a nation will first be
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priced in the CDS market and then will transfer into the nation’s stock market in the following
five days. This information flow will be most present when the CDS market is in a state of flux.
The hypothesis being that unconditionally the information flow between the CDS market
and the Stock market is small and insignificant; however once the analysis is conditioned on
credit shock or distress there will be significant and larger information flow from the CDS
market to the stock market.
I define credit distress under the following two conditions. Condition A focuses on credit
shocks that occur within one day of trading. I define a credit shock as an increase in a nations
CDS spread by thirty-five bps or greater. Condition B takes into account credit distress over an
average period of time. Looking at the different time blocks that lead up to and follow a crisis if
a country has an average CDS spread of 150 bps or greater for ninety days then it is labeled as
being in credit distress during that period.
In general my results confirmed my earlier hypothesis seeing the greatest amount of
information flow from the CDS to the stock markets happening during times of credit shock or
distress. These results are similar to the ones found by Acharya and Johnson (2007).
The time period used for collecting the data ranged from October 15th 2009 to October
14th 2010. The year encapsulated one of the most volatile times seen in the CDS market since its
creation. As found in this paper, times of credit crisis seem to return the greatest amount of
information flow between the markets. This paper expands off Acharya and Johnson (2007) to
measure the levels of contagion effect present in the European Union during the Greek Credit
Crisis of Spring 2010.
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With austerity measures becoming the hot topic in Europe throughout 2010 I analyzed a
sample of sixteen Euro Zone nations to better understand the market interdependence of the EU.
Again I compared the CDS market to the stock market, this time in order to measure the level of
contagion indication present in their returns. Using a vector auto regression and Granger
causality wald tests I compared the levels between the two.
Due to the co-integration of sovereign economies inherent in a union of nations the
contagion effect will most likely exist in a positively correlated direction in the CDS market but
will not be as present or significant in the much more efficient stock markets.
To evaluate this hypothesis I looked at the interaction on a country by country basis,
summing the coefficients in order to draw my final conclusion. From there I broke the countries
into four groups ranging from greatest CDS average spread level to lowest. Here once again I
confirmed that contagion effect in the stock market between Euro Zone nations to be
insignificant.
In order to see at what time period during a crisis the contagion effect is most present I
broke the year down into quarters, normal level, pre crisis level, crisis level, and post crisis level
all equal to ninety days. The hypothesis being that the Euro Zone CDS market will be most
vulnerable to the contagion effect during period three, “crisis level”. I ran the same regression as
used above conditional to the periods. My results differ from my hypothesis with a significant
positive correlation during period two “pre crisis level”, the ninety days leading up to a major
sovereign credit event.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 will present a review of the relevant
literature pertaining to CDS market integration and examples of contagion effects. Section 3 will
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detail the data collection techniques used as well as defining the intricacies of such information.
Section 4 reports and analyzes the regression results. The final Section 5 will conclude with a
more general understanding of the findings.

2. Review of Relevant Literature
The recent development of the credit derivative market has greatly altered the way sophisticated
investors manage credit risk. Since credit derivatives are not traded along with the underlining asset, their
transaction costs as well as overall liquidity issues are significantly reduced when compared to other
forms of credit protection. The CDS market has evolved to include a general index that allows investors
to manage their market wide credit risk. In 2004 the Dow Jones iTrazz index was formed out of the
combination of the iBoxx and Trac-x indicies. This has set a new precedent for liquidity and transparency
in the CDS market, Bystrom (2005). With the development of the CDS market over the past decade,
academics and investors alike have worked to analyze CDS fluctuations as it relates to other global
markets.
The most recent recession has placed the CDS market at the center of negative attention
stemming mainly from the debate over the Financial Reform Bill passed in July 2010. In a Reuters article
released in April of 2010, Anthony Sanders a finance professor at George Mason University stated,
“Credit Default saps are the current “villain du jour” in the Greek debt fiasco,” continuing, “In, fact CDSs
on Greek sovereign debt actually served a positive role: it alerted everyone around the globe that Greece
was in a credit death spiral.” Sanders disagrees with the movement by the United States to limit Credit
Default Swaps, rather this “alarm” he speaks of raises the question as to whether or not one can look at
sovereign CDS as a way to predict the future fiscal health of a country and the vitality of its major stock
indices. A new school of investing strategy, Capital Structure Arbitrage, looks to do just that. The
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intuition behind this form of arbitrage is to analyze discrepancies between the stock, CDS, and bond
markets.
Literature pertaining to the lead lag relationship between equity and bond markets is extensive,
however research of the CDS market as it relates to the others is much less developed. Alexander et al.
(2000) investigate the relationship between high yield non convertible bonds and the common stock of the
issuing firms from 1994 -1997. They find that a firm’s high yield bond excess returns have a positive
correlation with the excess returns of its stocks, Gordon J. Alexander (2000). Longstaff et al. (2005)
became one of the first papers to analyze lead-lag relationship between the stock, bond and CDS markets.
In a study of 67 single name CDS for March 2001- October 2002, they find strong evidence to conclude
that the CDS market information flow precedes the bond market; however there was no significant
evidence to conclude a directional flow in-between the stock and CDS markets, Longstaff, F. 2005. In an
analysis of 58 firms over the years 2000-2002, Norden and Weber analyze the movement of the three
markets on a monthly, weekly and daily basis. They find that stock returns lead CDS spreads as well as
bonds spreads. The CDS market sensitivity to stock market fluctuations is correlated to the firm’s credit
quality as well as rating. Using a Granger causality test, the paper finds that CDS spread changes cause
bond spread changes significantly more often than the opposite relation, Norden, L. (2009). In a paper
titled Credit Default Swaps and Equity Prices: The iTraxx CDS Index Market, Bystrom (2005), utilizes
the development of the Dow Jones iTraxx index, discussed earlier, to analyze the relationship between
CDS and the stock market. The index is comprised of 125 firms that all have currently trading equity
stocks. The paper reveals a close correlation between negative stock returns and positive CDS spread
increases similar to the previous paper. In addition, the paper concludes that in relation to firm specific
information the stock market is more relevant then the CDS market.
In order to better grasp the relationship between the two markets it is important to analyze the
credit quality of the sovereign nations in questions as well as global market trends. In an article looking
into Insider trading in the CDS market, Acharya and Johnson (2007) focus on 79 North American
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corporations from the years 2001-2004. Their intuition behind why the CDS market provides a prime
opportunity for insider trading is three fold: lower chance of detection, the CDS was created to provide an
ideal hedge on debt exposure, and buying of this protection is easier than shorting the matching bond.
They hypothesized that insider trader implies a greater flow of information from the CDS market to the
stock market in times when credit distress is greatest as well as when there is a large number of informed
investors, Acharya and Johnson (2007). They find that information flow between the CDS market to the
stock market is greatest on days with negative credit related news and for those firms that already have
high CDS spreads. In their conclusion they did not find any evidence to conclude that insider trading has
any negative impact on the CDS market as a whole. This paper reveals key elements of the CDS stock
market relationship that will be employed going forward in this paper.
In a related study to Acharya and Johnson, Fung et Al. (2008) using their own index composed
of 125 investment grade entities in North America studied the information flow between the CDS indices
and the S&P 500. In an attempt to see whether or not credit quality affected this relationship, the paper
analyzes the difference between investment grade and high yield CDS spreads and their relation to the
S&P. Their findings confirm that the lead lag relationship is related to the credit quality of the firm and is
only relevant during market down turns. In a surprising revelation the paper finds a strong feedback
effect from the high yield CDS market which could signal that the stock market does not account entirely
for all default risk of a firm. The paper concludes that the CDS market is the primary market for credit
risk price discovery.
The first hypothesis that this paper will address is the lead lag relationship of sovereign CDS
markets and global stock markets. To the best of my knowledge there has not been any literature on the
topic of sovereign CDS spreads leading global stock markets.
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H:1 - The deterioration of a countries credit quality during times of market crisis, ie. an
increase in CDS spreads during the Greek credit crisis, precedes a decrease in the domestic stock
market.
By specifically analyzing the Greek credit crisis of 2010 this paper will look to measure the
contagion effects in other sovereign CDS markets that are closely linked to Greece. In a study that looks
at credit contagion as it relates to Chapter 11 and Chapter 7 firm events Zhang (2005) attempts to provide
empirical significance to credit contagion. In order to do this, the paper looks at the effects of credit
events of a firm and to its most direct competitor. The argument being that Chapter 7 and 11 events affect
firms differently. Similar to Acharya and Johnson (2007), the paper also looks at the characteristics of the
specific firms. They find that credit quality, as well as the size of the firm, greatly impact the level of
contagion exhibited by the firm. The study finds that contagion effects are much greater in the CDS
market in comparison to the stock market.
My second hypothesis pertains to contagion effects in the sovereign CDS market as it relates to
the domestic stock exchange of the respective countries.
H:2 – Particular to the Greek Credit Crisis of 2010, sovereign credit contagion effects are
more apparent in the CDS market then in the complimentary stock markets.

3. Data
The Credit Default market utilizes CDS spreads to quote prices and initiate trades. The
spread is equal to a fraction of the theoretical value of the underlying asset and is paid by the
buyer in order to secure protection in the event of a default. In such an event the seller of the
CDS must pay the buyer the difference between the face value and the actual market value of the
underlining asset. Using the CDS spread one can judge to a certain extent the market perception
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of the default probability on a specific asset. In this paper the underlining asset is sovereign
debt, thus the sovereign CDS market gages the default probability of a nation.
The dataset used in this paper consists of CDS spreads and Stock returns from
Bloomberg. The data contains the CDS spreads of a grouping of Euro Zone nations as well as
their most valued respective stock market index returns. In order to compare both the Credit
Default Market as well as the stock market returns, I used Euro Zone countries where a national
stock exchange could be clearly identified as well as nations with an active credit default market.
The sixteen countries used are as follows: Greece, Portugal, Spain, Ireland, Belgium, Germany,
France, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Russia, Sweden, and the
United Kingdom. The Euro Zone nations selected allowed primarily for a diverse geographical
and economical return structure that spanned the EU.
In order to encapsulate the Greek Sovereign debt crisis earlier this year the dates used
ranged from October 15th 2009 to October14th 2010. This allowed for four periods: October 15th
2009 – January 14th 2010 level volatility, January 15th 2010 – April 14th 2010 pre crisis level,
April 15th 2010 – July 14th crisis level, and July 15th 2010 – October 14th 2010 post crisis level. I
used this quartile break down to highlight my regression analysis returns for different periods
during the crisis.
Credit Default Swaps are most widely traded in five year contracts. In order to minimize
issues with liquidity I used the US dollar denominated five year CDS contracts for the respective
sixteen nations. Tradable CDS contracts can range between six months to thirty years in
maturity, however the five year level is the benchmark in the industry (Hull, et al. 2004). The
notional amount of these contracts is 10 million US dollars.

9

CDS prices are quoted as spreads. These spreads refer to the premium that must be paid
annually as a percentage of the notional value of the underlining debt, more specifically in our
case, the sovereign debt obligation in order to hold the CDS contract. Similarly to Acharya and
Johnson (2007) I define CDS return as the log difference between the spread between time t and
t-1.
Using Bloomberg I collected equity index stock prices for the corresponding Euro Zone
countries adjusted for dividends paid. From this I generated daily stock returns in order to
compare the CDS and equity returns. By analyzing trade volume and market capitalization I
chose the following stock exchanges: ASE (Greece), PSI20 (Portugal), IBEX (Spain), ISEQ
(Ireland), BEL20 (Belgium), DAX (Germany), CAC (France), KAX (Denmark), HEX25
(Finland), BUX (Hungary), AEX (Netherlands), OSEAX (Norway), WIG20 (Poland), RTSI$
(Russia), OMX30ASK (Sweden), and UKX (The United Kingdom).

4. Methodology
In the following section I will outline my empirical analysis used to measure information
flow between the CDS and Stock market as well as the level of contagion effect seen in the Euro
Zone markets. In order to effectively measure information flow I first must create a CDS
innovation. From there I use this variable to measure the information flow from the CDS market
to the stock market. In order to analyze the different levels of contagion between the two types
of markets within the Euro Zone I use a Vector Auto Regression to measure such contagion
effects.
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4.1 Cross-Correlation
As a preliminary test of the interaction between the two markets, I run a basic cross
correlation regression. I regress CDS returns on stock market returns at time t, with a lead -5 and
lag of 5. The lead lag relationship captures the information flow five days before to five days
afterwards. For example stock market fluctuations at time t-5 would return a coefficient equal to
the subsequent decrease or increase of returns in the CDS market. From my preliminary research
I expect to see information flow from the CDS market to the stock market which would be
signaled by negative significant lag coefficients. The interaction intuitively should be negative,
as the stock exchange and CDS market are generally negatively correlated.
The results can be seen in the graphs of Figure 1 and differ in some regards from my
initial theory however not from previous research. Looking at the significant coefficients there is
information flow from the equity to CDS market at t-4 however there is also significant
information into the stock market on days t+1 through t+4. What is intriguing is that the markets
are positively correlated in lags t+2 to t+4 as well as t-4. At time t-4 for example, increased CDS
spread was affected by increase in the countries respective stock index four days prior. This
could signal that if investors anticipate an increase in a nation’s economy they are more likely to
purchase that countries debt, thus buy CDS protection in order to hedge their risk.
In order to further analyze the affects of the level of CDS spreads I selected the countries
in the top quartile of average CDS spread level: Greece, Portugal, Ireland, and Hungary. From
there I ran the same cross correlation regression. The results as to the positive correlation were
similar as above, however there was greater significant information flow from the CDS market to
the stock market, ie. a greater lag relationship, when compared with the unconditional regression.
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This keeps with the hypothesis that firms under greater credit distress will affect the future
returns of their stock market indices more than for those under average credit stress levels.

4.2 CDS Innovation
Since the stock and CDS markets are highly interdependent on one another I can not
simply regress the two returns to draw conclusions pertaining to information flow. In order to
separate the information solely present in the CDS market I must extract the residual from the
changes in the CDS returns on the stock returns at time t. To generate this residual, I regress
CDS returns on the contemporaneous stock returns, five lags of stock and CDS returns. With
this new residual variable I am able to analyze variations arising in the CDS market place.
The CDS innovation model I used follows the same method of construction as Acharya
and Johnson (2007). In order to validate their regression, Acharya and Johnson clarify that “the
relation between [CDS] changes and stock returns should be inherently nonlinear.” To account
for this issue their model utilizes the inverse CDS level and its relation with stock returns lagged
and at time t. Under the Merton (1974) model of risky debt Acharya and Johnson highlight the
interaction between the inverse CDS level and the elasticity that relates the percent changes in
stock price to the percent change in CDS spreads.
The regression is as follows: for each country i, I regress CDS returns on a constant, a
contemporaneous stock return, five lags of CDS and stock returns, and the product of these stock
returns and the inverse CDS level:
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Equation #1

,

The residual

,

,

,

,

,

,

,

, that can be extracted from this regression accounts for the independent

information flow found in the CDS market which is not priced in the stock market returns or not
relevant in estimating index returns. Going forward I refer to

, as the CDS innovation variable

or CDS inn.

4.3 Information Flows Originating in the CDS Market to the Stock Market
The following section analyzes the information flow from the sovereign CDS market to
the relevant stock markets. From my review of the relevant literature I expect that this
information flow to be most significant for countries exhibiting credit distress. Looking
specifically at the Greek Credit Crisis I expect the countries with the greatest average CDS
spread, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Ireland, and Hungary to have the most CDS directional
information flow. In order to statistically test this assumption I followed Acharya and Johnson
(2007) by estimating panel data using two conditions to highlight credit distress.
Equation #2

Condition A takes into consideration the four periods that I mentioned previously in the
data section. The four quarters break down the CDS returns into average, pre crisis, crisis, and
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then post crisis level. With this I generate a binary variable under the specifications that if a
credit shock occurs during the period the variable is set to 1 until the date of the sudden increase
in the CDS spread and 0 for the duration of the period. I define a credit shock as an increase in
CDS spread by 35 bps or greater. Acharya and Johnson use a 50 bps level, however since
sovereign CDS historically trades at a much lower average CDS spread compared to corporate
CDS I decreased the credit shock threshold. The intuition behind this is to analyze how stock
markets alone respond to such credit shocks.
Condition B takes a more broad approach to highlighting information flows by looking at
average CDS spreads throughout each time period. In order to look at countries in the greatest
credit distress, I set the dummy variable threshold to greater than 150 bps. Thus if a country has
an average CDS spread greater than this level, they receive a one, any country with less than a
150 bps average is assigned a zero for that period. In a time when Greece’s CDS spread reached
a level greater than 1,000 bps, the 150 level covered the countries that were most closely affected
by this increase.
Using the results from the conditional regressions, ∑
coefficients with the unconditional coefficients, ∑

I compare the result

. My intuition is that in the sovereign

sphere the conditional information flow will be more negative and significant than the
unconditional flow. If this is the case the summation of the conditional coefficients I expect to
be large and negative. ∑
The results, which can be found in Figure 2 Table A, confirm the previous assumptions.
Unconditionally there is very little information flow from the CDS innovation to the stock
returns, however when I implement the conditional dummy variables the results vary drastically.
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Under Condition A there is significant negative information flow from the CDS innovation to
stock returns. The results show an 8% information transmission flow from the CDS innovation
to stock returns for the five days following a large increase in CDS spread. This confirms the
hypothesis that during a spike in CDS level the CDS market will affect stock returns in the
coming days. Implementation of Condition B returns similar results. There is a large negative
information flow from the CDS innovation variable to the stock market, with the transmission
flow equal to 12%. Condition B reveals that for countries who experience average CDS levels
greater than 150 bps for a given period will have greater and more significant information flow
from the CDS market to the stock market. When the regression is unconditional, the coefficients
are minimal and insignificant however when adding restrictions based on CDS level the results
become significant and substantial highlighting information flow from the CDS innovation to
future stock returns for CDS level shocks and high average levels of credit distress.
Considering that the differences between nations is so vast in the way they conduct their
business, organize their markets, and structure their government it is very difficult to compare
the countries as a single entity. The next step in my analysis will attempt to minimize the
country by country differences by regressing stock returns on the lags of both the CDS
innovation and stock returns for each of the sixteen countries in my sample. Similar to Acharya
and Johnson (2007) I use the replicate the regression from Hou and Moskowitz (2005):
Equation #3

,

,

,

,

,
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From the summation of the beta coefficients for each county under the specific lag I am
able to quantify the amount of information flow that can be termed permanent from the CDS
market to the stock market. This method I replicate from my previous regression,
.
Theta represents the level of CDS market information flow and the sustainability of such
flow in the respective stock markets. If the average theta is large and negative, one can draw the
conclusion that there is a strong and permanent level of information flow from the CDS market
to the stock markets. I expect this result for the firms with the highest average CDS spread.
In order to better illustrate the relationship between credit stress and information flow I
broke the sixteen firms into four different categories ranging from lowest average CDS spread to
greatest. From there I looked at the average theta return. It is expected that under this condition,
the mean theta level should be most negative for the countries with the greatest CDS spread
levels.
The regression confirms my expectations. As can be seen in Figure 3, there is significant
information flow from the CDS innovation to stock returns for the respective countries. With the
established separate quarters I calculated the average CDS spread for each group. Again the
results reaffirm my hypothesis, in countries that experience significant credit distress there is
greater information flow from the CDS market to the stock market. For Q4, the quartile with the
highest average CDS spread, the sum of

is equal to -.190395. The results indicate that as

average CDS spreads decrease so does the level of significant information flow.
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4.4 Contagion Level Comparison
The level of market interdependence of Euro Zone nations has been argued as one of the
greatest risks of the European Union. The Greek Sovereign crisis highlighted the risks of such
market linkage. The consequence translated into stock market loses as well as large increases in
respective CDS Spreads. The level to which each market was affected has never been measured
for this crisis. The following section evaluates the hypothesis that there is a greater contagion
effect in the CDS market. My reasoning behind this hypothesis is due to the lack of liquidity in
the CDS market it is inherently less efficient than the stock markets. Thus a change in the CDS
market for a country may not be immediately be priced into the CDS market of a complimentary
country until five days in the future.
In order to test this hypothesis I utilized a Vector Auto Regression. A VAR compares the
levels of interaction between two or more variables as they relate to each other. In my example I
use Greece as my bench mark nation as it was the source of the credit crisis. From there I
compare each of the other fifteen countries CDS markets with Greece’s market; as well as run a
similar VAR evaluating the interaction between each respective countries stock exchange. Using
the following equations I evaluate the interactions by country.
1

∑

,

,

.

.

2

,

,

∑

,

,

∑

,

.

,

.

.
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,

∑
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,
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I expect that the sum of the lagged coefficients for Greece vs. Countryi CDS Spread
interaction will be greater than that of the Athens Stock Exchange vs. Countryi Exchange.
Keeping with my hypothesis I anticipate there to be higher significance in my coefficients of the
CDS market. If the sum of the lagged coefficients is large and positive, this signals a contagion
effect such that an increase in the CDS spread in Greece causes an increase in CDS spread in
Countryi in the future.
In order to test for significance I utilize a Granger causality wald test. In Figure 4, Table
C, I display the results of this test. To better interpret the significance results I will explain Table
C in greater detail. Focusing on the relationship between Spain and Greece, the Granger
causality test sets Greece’s coefficients to zero and evaluates null hypothesis which states that
this will have no affect on Ireland’s CDS spread levels. Setting Greece’s coefficients to zero, as
Greece is the excluded variable in this example, we can reject the null hypothesis as its p-value is
equal to 8.3%. Meaning that Greece Granger causes Spain’s CDS level over a five day lagged
period.
To better highlight the differences in CDS spread levels and contagion, I separate the
countries into four groups ranging from lowest average CDS spread to highest. I expect the
results to show greater Granger causality significance for the CDS market versus the stock
market, with the greatest CDS spread level being the most significant pairing. Similar to the
previous section, due to the lower liquidity levels of the CDS market, there is more of an
opportunity to witness spillover effects than in the highly efficient global stock exchanges.
Countries with greater average CDS spreads represent sovereign economies who are more
vulnerable to the fluctuating health of the country experiencing extreme credit distress. If
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Greece’s CDS spreads are increasing one should see a greater contagion effect in countries who
are also experiencing some level of credit distress.
The results in Table D are in line with my first assumption, however they do not show an
increase in significance with an increase in average CDS spread level. First looking at the
difference in level of Granger significance, it is apparent that there is more contagion in the CDS
market than the stock market with three of the four CDS Levels returning significant Granger
causality values. In comparison only one level out of the four is statistically significant when
determining causality in the stock market. One can not confirm the assumption that countries
with greater CDS spreads see more of a contagion effect in the CDS market when compared to
countries with lower spread levels. The greatest level of causality is seen for the Level 3
countries, with a significance level of .000; however one can draw the conclusion that there are
other factors affecting the contagion in the CDS market then the general level of CDS spreads.
After analyzing the entire sample period I focus now on the period ranges I have predefined earlier. This is in order to highlight the interaction between the markets during times of
crisis. I expect that during times of greatest credit distress, there will be the largest correlation
and contagion in the CDS market. To explore this idea, I run the same regression as above
specifically for each of the four periods. In order to be able to measure the actual impacts of the
contagion per period I run the regression country by country adjusting solely the period
parameters. I expect the results on average to be of a greater positive magnitude during period
three which is when the credit crisis met its absolute climax.
The results, which can be seen in Table E, differ from my initial assumptions. It is seen
that an increase in Greece CDS spreads causes movements in Countryi CDS market ranging from
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-.144 to 1.182 for at least one period over the five day lag. What is surprising is that for every
country besides Poland there is significant positive contagion affect during Period 2, in the
ninety days prior to the crisis climax. One possible conclusion is that in the months preceding
the crisis time, investors where relying mainly on Greece’s CDS level when making decisions in
the CDS market. Once the debate about the possibility of a European Union bailout process
began investors based their decisions more on the probability of the bailout being agreed upon.
It was during Period 3 where it became apparent that the Greek crisis had become a European
Union crisis. Thus the CDS market in Greece ceased to be the driving force of the CDS markets
around Europe, rather the EU member states CDS markets became linked to their ability to
remedy this situation at the collective level.
The Granger causality tests and result coefficients provide information on the relation
between countries either in the CDS market or stock market. These results provide us with the
ability to find level of significance and highlight patterns for countries. This broken down
further one can draw conclusions on market timing during certain periods of a credit crisis. To
expand off these pattern interactions one could structure an event study as to the release of news
of bailout proceedings or EU austerity measures. The VAR model used in this paper can not
effectively be used as a trading basis because the interactions between nations are constantly in
flux. For example debt levels and location of this debt changes on a daily basis. If Portugal buys
a significant amount of Spanish bonds, then the countries co-interaction in the markets will
inherently increase. This paper does not explore such interaction.
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5. Conclusion
Presented in this paper is an analysis of market interaction between the sovereign CDS
market and the respective stock exchanges, as well as a measure of the contagion effect present
within the Euro Zone pertaining to these two markets. Initial I use the model and analysis
techniques found in Acharya and Johnson (2007). Where my methodology differs is that I focus
on the sovereign Credit Default Swap market and the respective stock exchanges of the countries
in the data set. I build on their findings of information flows by utilizing a Vector Auto
Regression to measure the contagion effect between nations within the Euro Zone.
The findings of this paper leave room for advancement in future research. The data is
comprised of daily end of the day quotes of the CDS market, unfortunately this does not fully
capture all fluctuations in the market. Yes, not as liquid as the stock exchange, the CDS market
does experience intraday movements especially during crisis periods which was not fully
calculated in my regression. Using intraday quotes would enhance the depth of the findings.
Another option to improve the future research in this topic is by varying the credit
conditions I used to define a credit shock and credit distress. Using Acharya and Johnson as my
primary reference I chose these levels in order to better estimate the sovereign CDS market. In
the future these levels can be varied to affect the regression returns.
The results confirm the initial hypothesis that there is information flow from the
sovereign CDS market into the stock market of the measured nations. This had never been
proven in the sovereign sphere before and thus provides a base to continue research into this
interaction. The paper also finds that CDS contagion is greatest in the period immediately
preceding a crisis. As mentioned earlier one can not effectively use this as a trading strategy
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however this is can be furthered analyzed using an event study. This technique would help to pin
point what causes such level of contagion effect in the CDS market during the ninety days
leading up to a major sovereign credit crisis. In response to the question as to whether or not
CDS markets can be looked at as an early warning system for credit stress of nations, my paper
agrees with this statement as the results show that the sovereign CDS market can be a good
indicator of credit distress and the countries that are most vulnerable to the contagion effect
during a crisis.
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6. Tables
Figure 1
Graph A
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Figure 1 - The graphs above display the cross correlation regression results from section 4.1. In
order to capture the preliminary relationship I regressed CDS market returns on the lead (t-5) and
lagged (t+5) stock market returns for the respective countries. Graph B highlights the same
regression relationship conditional to the four countries in the top quarter of the sample for CDS
spread level (Greece, Portugal, Ireland, and Hungary).
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Figure 2
Table A

С

Condition A

Condition B

.00526
.027

.00544
.023

-.02325
.346

-.0245502
.158

-.07900
.000

-.11951
.000

-.34854
.000

-.10587
.0343

-.043368
.3074

-.17150
.001

Total number of Countries = 16
Table A - The table above uses two different credit dummies to display the information flow
between a countries CDS market and its respective stock exchange. The coefficients are
summed to include the entire data set of sixteen Euro Zone countries. See Equation #2. Below
the summed coefficients are the respective p-values.
The two credit conditions are as follows:
Condition A – Conditions for a credit shock greater than 35 bps during a period. If a
country experiences an increase of their CDS spread equal to or greater than 35 bps then
they receive a 1 from the beginning of the period to the date of the credit shock and a
zero until the end of the period.
Condition B – The dummy variable conditions for high average CDS levels. If a country
experiences an average CDS level greater than or equal to 150 then they receive a one for
the entire period.

24

Figure 3
Table B
1st Quarter

2nd Quarter

3rd Quarter

4th Quarter

Average

.019535

.04245

-.05476

-.19354

Mean CDS
Spread

43.769

134.538

163.304

181.008

Total Number of Countries = 16 Countries Per Period = 4

Table B – Using Equation #3, the regression returned results for each country over a five lagged
∑
period. Using
, I summed the lagged results in order to obtain a measure of
comparison. The results are broken down into quarters ranging from the most positive summed
to the most negative. From there the average CDS spread is calculated for the respective
quarters. Each quarter has a total of four countries. See below for the breakdown of the
quarters:
1st Quarter

Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the UK

2nd Quarter

Spain, Ireland, Denmark, Poland

3rd Quarter

Greece, Germany, France, Finland

4th Quarter

Portugal, Belgium, Hungary, Russia
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Figure 4
Table C – Country by Country Granger Causality Test Results
Countryi

Independent Variable

ProbStock > Chi2

ProbCDS > Chi2

Portugal

Greece

.242

.904

Spain

Greece

.654

.083

Ireland

Greece

.638

.040

Belgium

Greece

.557

.136

Germany

Greece

.768

.001

France

Greece

.660

.000

Denmark

Greece

.454

.140

Finland

Greece

.923

.000

Hungary

Greece

.837

.288

Netherlands

Greece

.973

.000

Norway

Greece

.904

.054

Poland

Greece

.424

.169

Russia

Greece

.019

.107

Sweden

Greece

.973

.000

United Kingdom

Greece

.880

.848

Average Lagged Coefficients =

.0729

.1616

Table C – Using Equation #4, presented are the results from the Granger Causality Wald Test.
Using Greece as the universal independent variable, the table shows the Granger causality level
of the interaction between Countryi and Greece first in the stock market and then in the CDS
market. For example in the CDS market Greece is said to Granger cause Spain but not in the
stock market.
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Table D – Granger Causality Results Grouped by CDS Level
CDS Level

Independent Variable

ProbStock > Chi2

ProbCDS > Chi2

Level 1

Greece

.343

.007

Level 2

Greece

.030

.143

Level 3

Greece

.654

.000

Level 4

Greece

.577

.009

Level 1

Germany, Finland, Denmark, Norway

Level 2

France, Netherlands, United Kingdom, Sweden

Level 3

Spain, Belgium, Poland, Russia

Level 4

Portugal, Ireland, Hungary

Table D – Utilizing Equation #4 the table presents the results of the Granger Causality test . The
different levels are based upon average CDS Spread over the entire sample period, ranging from
smallest to largest. Again using Greece as the universal independent variable the causality
significance is reported for both the Stock Market as well as the CDS market.
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Table E – Country by Country Summed Coefficients of Countryi and Greece Conditional
on 90 Day Periods
Countryi
Portugal

Period 1

Period 2

Period 3

Period 4

-0.1701

0.4746

0.0295

0.4007

0.2989

1.1817

0.4666

0.8177

Ireland

-0.1441

0.3451

0.0218

0.5914

Belgium

-0.3113

0.4087

0.0617

0.5080

Germany

0.2874

0.5396

0.1397

0.6367

France

0.3862

0.3708

-0.1038

0.6678

-0.0482

0.2946

0.2590

0.3580

Finland

0.3926

0.5332

0.2077

0.2624

Hungary

0.4745

0.1334

0.1402

0.3535

-0.0429

0.2783

0.4885

0.2506

Norway

0.1401

0.4832

0.4174

0.1670

Poland

0.8594

0.1713

0.0643

0.6208

Russia

0.0699

0.2238

0.2760

0.4547

Sweden

0.0500

0.4185

0.2595

0.2915

United Kingdom

0.0559

0.2013

0.2480

0.3610

Spain

Denmark

Netherlands

Average

.15322

.40387

.1984

.44945

Table E – Running the same regression as Table A using Equation #4 I analyze the difference
between periods. The results are the summed coefficients of the lagged interaction between
Countryi as the dependent variable and Greece as the universal independent variable. The
summed results “Bolded” and “Underlined” ie. the results for Portugal in Period 2, .4746 are
significant.
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